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Abstract
To verify whether a transferable utility game is exact, one has to check a linear inequal-
ity for each exact balanced collection of coalitions. This paper studies the structure and
properties of the class of exact balanced collections. Comparing the definition of exact
balanced collections with the definition of balanced collections, the weight vector of a
balanced collection must be positive whereas the weight vector for an exact balanced
collection may contain one negative weight. We investigate minimal exact balanced col-
lections, and show that only these collections are needed to obtain exactness. The relation
between minimality of an exact balanced collection and uniqueness of the corresponding
weight vector is analyzed. We show how the class of minimal exact balanced collections
can be partitioned into three basic types each of which can be systematically generated.
Keywords: Cooperative games; exact games; exact balanced collections.
1 Introduction
One of the most important notions in cooperative game theory is the core. Introduced by
Gillies (1953), the core consists of all allocations that are both individually and coalitionally
stable. Given an allocation in the core of the game, no coalition has an incentive to split off.
There exist games for which such an allocation does not exist, resulting in an empty core.
Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) showed independently that non-emptiness of the core
is equivalent with balancedness.
A collection of coalitions is balanced if one can find positive weights for all coalitions in the
collection such that every player is present in coalitions with total weight exactly equal to one.
A game is balanced if for all such collections and all such weights, the weighted sum of the
values of the coalitions does not exceed the value of the grand coalition. An interpretation is
that the players can distribute one unit of working time among all coalitions in a way that for
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every coalition all members are active for an amount of time equal to the coalition’s weight,
and in doing so the players cannot create more value than by working one unit of time in the
grand coalition.
A game is exact (Schmeidler, 1972) if for every coalition, there exists a core element that
allocates precisely the value of the coalition to its members. So, in such a core element
the coalition gets exactly its stand alone value. Classes of games that are exact are e.g.
convex games (Shapley, 1971), risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty (Cso´ka
et al., 2009), convex multi-choice games (Branzei et al., 2009) and multi-issue allocation
games (Calleja et al., 2005). Exactness turns out to be equivalent with exact balancedness as
introduced in (Cso´ka et al., 2007). Exact balancedness is similar to the notion of balancedness,
when we allow one of the weights to be negative.
To verify that the core of a game is non-empty, not all balanced collections are needed. A
balanced collection of coalitions is minimal, if there does not exist a proper subset that is also
balanced. As it turns out, only minimal balanced collections have to be considered to ensure
non-emptiness of the core. This greatly reduces the number of constraints to be checked for
non-emptiness of the core. Furthermore, the class of minimal balanced collections is sharp,
in the sense that there exists no subclass of the class of minimal balanced collections that
ensures balancedness of the game.
Regarding exact balancedness, many exact balanced collections are redundant when ver-
ifying the exactness of a game. We show that only minimal exact balanced collections are
essential to obtain exactness. However, it is not possible to use the same approach as with
minimal balanced collections. This is due to the fact that while the set of balanced weight
vectors is a convex set in which the extreme points are the weight vectors corresponding with
minimal balanced collections, the set of exact balanced weight vectors is not a convex set.
This requires a different approach for the proofs.
We show that the class of minimal exact balanced collections can be partitioned into
three types. The first type consists of all minimal balanced sets. The second type, the class
of minimal subbalanced collections, is formed by all minimal balanced collections for every
proper subgame, to which two coalitions are added: the grand coalition of the subgame,
and the grand coalition of the original game. The last type, the class of minimal negative
balanced collections, consists of all other minimal exact balanced collections for which every
weight vector has one negative weight.
A main result regards the special structure of the class of minimal negative balanced
collections. We show that every minimal negative balanced collection can be obtained from
a minimal balanced collection by replacing one coalition, with a weight strictly smaller than
one, by its complement. Moreover, for every minimal negative balanced collection there exists
exactly one such combination of a minimal balanced collection and a coalition with a weight
strictly smaller than one.
The class of minimal exact balanced collections ensures exactness of the game, but the
class can be reduced even further. We show that only the class of minimal subbalanced
collections and the class of minimal negative balanced collections are needed to guarantee
exactness. So, the class of minimal balanced collections is redundant.
2
With respect to the uniqueness of the weights, it is well known that the class of minimal
balanced collections coincides with the set of balanced collections for which the set of balanced
weight vectors consists of one point. A similar result can be obtained for minimal exact
balanced collections. If the exact balanced weight vector is unique for a certain exact balanced
collection, then this collection is minimal exact balanced. The other way around is not true in
the strict sense. For two types, minimal balanced and minimal negative balanced collections,
the corresponding weight vector is unique. For every minimal subbalanced collection however,
there exists more than one exact balanced weight vector but all weight vectors are related to
each other by a linear transformation, and induce the same constraint on the game.
In the process, we also see how we can systematically and efficiently generate all mini-
mal exact balanced collections, by adapting the inductive approach to construct all minimal
balanced collections by Peleg (1965).
The paper is organized as follows: the subsequent section introduces some notions regard-
ing cooperative game theory, and repeats the main results regarding balanced collections.
Section 3 contains the definitions of several notions regarding exact balancedness, and in-
cludes the results on the uniqueness of the weights. Section 4 shows that the class of minimal
exact balanced collections can be partitioned into three easily identifiable types. Section 5
states that minimal exact balanced collections are sufficient to ensure exactness of the game.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Balancedness
First, we introduce some basic notions regarding cooperative game theory and balancedness.
Given a finite player set N , a transferable utility game v ∈ TUN is defined by a function v
on the set 2N of all subsets of N assigning to each coalition S ∈ 2N a value v(S) such that
v(∅) = 0. Define N = 2N\{∅}, and for all S ∈ N let eS ∈ RN be such that eSi = 1 if i ∈ S
and eSi = 0 otherwise. For a game v ∈ TU
N , the core C(v) is defined as the set of efficient
pay-off vectors, for which no coalition has an incentive to split off:
C(v) = {x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N),
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ N}.
To check for non-emptiness of the core, one can use the notion of balancedness.
Definition 2.1. Let B ⊆ N ,B 6= {N}. A weight vector β ∈ RN is called balanced on B if
βS > 0 for all S ∈ B, βS = 0 for all S 6∈ B and
∑
S∈B βSe
S = eN . We denote Λ+(B) for
the set of all balanced weight vectors on B. The collection B is called balanced if Λ+(B) 6= ∅.
Denote BN for the set of all balanced collections on player set N , and Λ+ = ∪B∈BNΛ
+(B).
In the remainder, we will typically use B and C to denote balanced collections, and use β
and γ to denote their respective weight vectors.
Example 2.2. Let N = {1, 2}. The collections {{1}} and {{2}} are not balanced, since one
of the players is not present in the collection. By definition {{1, 2}} is not balanced. The
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collection {{1}, {1, 2}} is not balanced. This follows as a balanced weight vector β cannot
satisfy the equations β{1,2} = 1 and β{1} + β{1,2} = 1 simultaneously, since β{1} > 0. A
similar reasoning holds for the collection {{2}, {1, 2}}. The two remaining collections are
B = {{1}, {2}} and C = {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}}, which are both balanced. Take β ∈ Λ+ such that
β{1} = β{2} = 1 and βS = 0 for S ∈ N\{{1}, {2}}, and take γ ∈ Λ
+ such that γ{1,2} = 1 and
γS = 0 for S ∈ N\{{1, 2}}. We have Λ
+(B) = {β} while Λ+(C) = {aβ+(1−a)γ | a ∈ (0, 1)}.
⊳
Now, for a vector β ∈ RN , we define the set
V (β) = {v ∈ TUN |
∑
S∈N
βSv(S) ≤ v(N)}
of transferable utility games for which the weighted sum of the values of the coalitions with
respect to β is less than of equal to the worth of the grand coalition. Also, we define V +(B) =
∩β∈Λ+(B)V (β) and V
+ = ∩B∈BNV
+(B). So, V +(B) is the set of games that satisfy the
constraints imposed by all balanced weight vectors for collection B, and V + is the set of
games that satisfy the constraints imposed by all balanced weight vectors.
Consider some B ∈ BN . Note that v ∈ V (β) for some β ∈ Λ+(B) does not imply that
v ∈ V +(B). This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 2.3. Consider a three person game v ∈ TUN such that v({1}) = 2, v({1, 2}) = 8,
v({1, 3}) = 8, v({2, 3}) = 4 and v(N) = 8. We find that the balanced collection B =
{{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} corresponds with more than one balanced weight vector, for in-
stance β = (12 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
3
4) and γ = (
1
4 ,
3
8 ,
3
8 ,
5
8). We have that
∑
S∈B
βSv(S) =
1
2
v({1}) +
1
4
v({1, 2}) +
1
4
v({1, 3}) +
3
4
v({2, 3}) = 8 = v(N),
but ∑
S∈B
γSv(S) =
1
4
v({1}) +
3
8
v({1, 2}) +
3
8
v({1, 3}) +
5
8
v({2, 3}) = 9 > v(N).
So, v ∈ V (β) but v 6∈ V (γ). This implies that v 6∈ V +(B). ⊳
We call a game v ∈ TUN balanced if v ∈ V +.
Theorem 2.4 (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967). Let v ∈ TUN . Then C(v) 6= ∅ if and only
if v ∈ V +.
It is well known that not all balanced collections are necessary to guarantee that a game
is balanced. Minimal balanced collections suffice to characterize the class of games with a
non-empty core.
Definition 2.5. A collection B ∈ BN is called minimal balanced if there does not exist a
C ( B such that C ∈ BN . The class of minimal balanced collections on player set N is
denoted by BNmin.
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Note that in Example 2.2, only the collection {{1}, {2}} is minimal balanced. We define
V +min = ∩B∈BN
min
V +(B) as the class of games that satisfy the constraints originating from
minimal balanced collections.
Theorem 2.6 (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967). A game v ∈ TUN is balanced if and only
if v ∈ V +min, i.e. V
+ = V +min.
Not only do we need just the minimal balanced collections to characterize the non-emptiness
of the core, an additional advantage of minimal balanced collections is that for every minimal
balanced collection there exists only one balanced vector of weights. For the following theorem,
we provide the proof by Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003) as we will use a similar technique later
on to prove results on minimal exact balanced collections.
Theorem 2.7 (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967). A collection B ∈ BN is minimal balanced
if and only if |Λ+(B)| = 1.
Proof. (Peleg and Sudho¨lter, 2003) Let B ∈ BN . Take β ∈ Λ+(B).
First we show that a balanced collection that is not minimal corresponds to more than
one balanced weight vector. If C ( B is a balanced collection with weights γ ∈ Λ+(C), then
it is readily verified that aγ + (1 − a)β ∈ Λ+(B) for a ∈ [0, 1), so the weight vector for B is
not unique.
Second, we show that every collection with more than one balanced weight vector is not
minimal. Assume that there exists another weight vector α ∈ Λ(B), α 6= β. As there exists a
coalition S ∈ B such that βS > αS , we obtain that a = min{
αS
βS−αS
| βS > αS} is well defined.
Let γS = (1+ a)αS − aβS for all S ∈ B. Then C = {S ∈ B | γS > 0} is a proper subcollection
of B with γ ∈ Λ+(C). So, C ∈ BN and B is not minimal.
The following theorem states that we cannot characterize the set of balanced games by a
subset of the minimal balanced collections.
Theorem 2.8 (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967). Let B ∈ BNmin. Then there exists a game
v ∈ TUN such that v ∈ V +(C) for all collections C ∈ BNmin\{B} and v 6∈ V
+(B).
3 Exact balancedness
Games with a non-empty core can be characterized using balanced collections. A similar
characterization exists for exact games. Exact games form a subclass of the class of games
with a non-empty core.
Definition 3.1. A game v ∈ TUN is exact if for every coalition S ∈ N there exists an
x ∈ C(v) such that
∑
i∈S xi = v(S).
Schmeidler (1972) provides a characterization of exact games. Cso´ka et al. (2007) introduces a
different characterization which is called exact balancedness. Here, we use exact balancedness
as defined by Cso´ka et al. (2007) except that in line with Definition 2.1 we exclude the trivial
collection {N}.
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Definition 3.2. (Cso´ka et al., 2007) For a collection E ⊆ N , E 6= {N}, a vector of weights
λ ∈ RN is called exact balanced if there exists a T ∈ E such that λS > 0 for all S ∈ E\{T},
λT 6= 0, λS = 0 for all S 6∈ E, and
∑
S∈E λSe
S = eN . We denote Λ(E) for the set of all exact
balanced vectors on E. A collection E ⊆ N is called exact balanced if Λ(E) 6= ∅. Denote EN
for the set of all exact balanced collections on player set N , and Λ = ∪E∈ENΛ(E).
In the remainder, we will typically use E and D to denote exact balanced collections, and use
λ and δ to denote their respective weight vectors.
Note the discrepancy with the definition of balanced vectors. For exact balanced weight
vectors, we allow for one negative weight. It is readily checked that Λ+(E) ⊆ Λ(E) for every
E ⊆ N , and therefore BN ⊆ EN . In contrast with Λ+, Λ in general is not a convex set, since
a convex combination of two elements of Λ is not necessarily an element of Λ.
Example 3.3. Let N = {1, 2, 3}. Take λ, δ ∈ RN such that λ{1,2} = λ{1,3} = 1, λ{1} = −1
and δ{1,2} = δ{2,3} = 1, δ{2} = −1. Clearly, λ and δ are exact balanced weight vectors.
However, the convex combination 12 (λ + δ) is not an exact balanced weight vector, as it has
two negative components. This means that Λ is not a convex set. ⊳
Define, similar to the definitions of V +(B) and V +, V (E) = ∩λ∈Λ(E)V (λ) for all E ∈ E
N
and V = ∩E∈ENV (E). As V (λ) is the class of games that satisfy the constraint imposed by
weight vector λ, V (E) is the set of all games that satisfy the constraints imposed by the exact
balanced weight vectors of the collection E and V is the class of exact balanced games.
Theorem 3.4 (Cso´ka et al., 2007). A game v ∈ TUN is exact if and only if v ∈ V .
So, just as balancedness is equivalent with non-emptiness of the core we have that exact
balancedness is equivalent with the existence for every coalition of a core element where this
coalition gets precisely its stand-alone value. Similar to the definition of minimal balanced
collections, we define minimal exact balanced collections.
Definition 3.5. A collection E ∈ EN is minimal exact balanced if there exists no D ( E such
that D ∈ EN . We denote ENmin for the class of minimal exact balanced collections.
Example 3.6. Regarding exact balancedness, a similar reasoning as in Example 2.2 can be
used to show that only {{1}, {2}} and {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}} are exact balanced for two-person
games. Since clearly Λ(E) = Λ+(E) for every E ∈ EN , we have EN = BN and ENmin = B
N
min.
This is not surprising, since for two-player games, whenever the core is non-empty there exists
a core element where player 1 gets v({1}) and there exists a core element where player 2 gets
v({2}). So, the concepts of balancedness and exactness are equivalent for two player games.
For games with three or more players, BN ( EN . For a player set consisting of three players,
ENmin and B
N
min are given in Table 1. ⊳
If the size of the player set increases, the number of collections in the different classes grows
considerably. Table 2 shows the number of collections in all classes for up to 4 players. The
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BNmin E
N
min
{1}, {2}, {3} {1}, {2}, {3}
{1, 2}, {3} {1, 2}, {3}
{1, 3}, {2} {1, 3}, {2}
{2, 3}, {1} {2, 3}, {1}
{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3} {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}
{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}
{2}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}
{3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}
{1}, {2}, {1, 2}, N
{1}, {3}, {1, 3}, N
{2}, {3}, {2, 3}, N
Table 1: Minimal balanced and minimal exact balanced collections for N = {1, 2, 3}.
|N | 3 4
|BN | 42 18878
|BNmin| 5 41
|EN | 63 27014
|ENmin| 11 165
Table 2: Number of collections in the different classes.
minimal balanced collections as well as the minimal exact balanced collections are generated
using methods introduced later on in this paper. Appendix A contains all minimal exact
balanced collections and the corresponding weight vectors for 3- and 4-player games. Here,
the minimal balanced collections are partitioned in three classes that will be introduced in
Section 4: minimal balanced collections, minimal negative balanced collections and minimal
subbalanced collections.
As we have shown in Theorem 2.7, the class of minimal balanced collections coincides
with the set of balanced collections with a unique weight vector. For minimal exact balanced
collections, a somewhat weaker statement holds: the class of minimal exact balanced collec-
tions not containing the grand coalition coincides with the set of exact balanced collections
with a unique weight vector.
Theorem 3.7. Let E ∈ EN . Then E ∈ ENmin and N 6∈ E if and only if |Λ(E)| = 1.
Proof. We prove the ‘only if’ part of the theorem by showing that we can construct an exact
balanced subcollection of E if the weight vector is not unique. Take E ∈ ENmin with N 6∈ E .
Suppose that there exist two weight vectors λ, µ ∈ Λ(E) such that λ 6= µ.
If both λ ∈ Λ+(E) and µ ∈ Λ+(E), we have by Theorem 2.7 that E 6∈ BNmin. Hence, there
exists an exact balanced subcollection of E in this case.
Next assume E ∈ BNmin, λ ∈ Λ
+(E) and µ 6∈ Λ+(E). Let U ∈ E be such that µU < 0, and
take a = min{λS
µS
| S ∈ E\{U}} and β = 11−a(λ− aµ). Note that 0 < a < 1 since λS > 0 and
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µS > 0 for all S ∈ E\{U}, and a ≥ 1 would imply that
eN =
∑
S∈E
µSe
S =
∑
S∈E\{U}
µSe
S + µUe
U <
∑
S∈E\{U}
λSe
S + λUe
U
=
∑
S∈E
λSe
S ≤ eN ,
where the strict inequality uses that µU < 0 < λU . Note that βS =
1
1−a(λS − aµS) ≥ 0 for
all S ∈ E , with equality for at least one coalition. If we take B = {S ∈ E | βS > 0}, then
B is a proper subset of E and
∑
S∈B βSe
S =
∑
S∈E βSe
S =
∑
S∈E
(
λS
1−ae
S − aµS1−ae
S
)
= eN , so
B ∈ BN which contradicts E ∈ BNmin.
Finally, let λ 6∈ Λ+(E) and µ 6∈ Λ+(E). This means that there exist coalitions T ∈ E and
U ∈ E such that λT < 0 and µU < 0.
Assume T = U . Take a = min{λS
µS
| S ∈ E}. Note that a > 0 since for S ∈ E either both
λS > 0 and µS > 0 or both λS < 0 and µS < 0. It holds that a < 1, as a ≥ 1 would imply that
either λ = µ or
∑
S∋i λS >
∑
S∋i µS = 1 for i ∈ N\T , a non-empty set since by assumption
N 6∈ E . We construct δS =
1
1−aλS −
a
1−aµS for all S ∈ E and D = {S ∈ E | δS 6= 0}. It
is readily verified that δS ≥ 0 for all S ∈ D\{T} and
∑
S∈D δSe
S = eN . This shows that
D ∈ EN and by construction D ( E , which contradicts E ∈ ENmin.
Now assume T 6= U . Take a = µT
µT−λT
. It is readily checked that 0 < a < 1. Take
δ = aλ+ (1 − a)µ and D = {S ∈ E | δS 6= 0}. We have δS > 0 for every S ∈ D\{T,U} and
δT = 0. Since
∑
S∈D δSe
S =
∑
S∈E aλSe
S +
∑
S∈E(1− a)µSe
S = eN this shows that D ∈ EN
which contradicts E ∈ ENmin.
To prove the ‘if’ part of the theorem, let E ⊆ N be such that Λ(E) = {λ} for some λ ∈ RN .
First suppose E 6∈ ENmin. We show that we can construct a second weight vector in Λ(E). As
E 6∈ ENmin, there exists an exact balanced subcollection D ( E . Take µ ∈ Λ(D) and define
the function f : [0, 1] → RN by f(b) = (1 − b)λ + bµ. As f is continuous, there exists
an ǫ > 0 such that the sign of fS(ǫ) coincides with the sign of λS for all S ∈ E . Since∑
S∈E fS(ǫ)e
S =
∑
S∈E(1 − ǫ)λSe
S +
∑
S∈D ǫµSe
S = eN , we obtain that f(ǫ) ∈ Λ(E) while
f(ǫ) 6= λ, a contradiction.
Secondly, suppose N ∈ E . It is readily checked that λN ≤ 1, and if λN < 1 we obtain
that the collection A = E\{N} is exact balanced with weight vector µS =
λS
1−λN
for every
S ∈ A which contradicts E ∈ ENmin. Hence, λN = 1. As
∑
S∈E\{N} λSe
S = 0, we have that∑
S∈E\{N} 2λSe
S = 0. Define the weight vector µ by µS = 2λS for all S ∈ E\{N}, µN = 1
and µS = 0 otherwise. It is readily checked that µ ∈ Λ(E) with µ 6= λ, a contradiction.
There exist minimal exact balanced collections with more than one exact balanced weight
vector. By Theorem 3.7 such a collection must contain the set N .
Example 3.8. Take N = {1, 2, 3}. The collection E = {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}, N} is minimal
exact balanced, but there exists more than one weight vector: define λ by λ{1} = λ{2} = 1,
λ{1,2} = −1 and λN = 1 and µ by µ{1} = µ{2} = 2, µ{1,2} = −2 and µN = 1. It is readily
checked that λ ∈ Λ(E) and µ ∈ Λ(E). ⊳
8
If a minimal exact balanced collection does contain the grand coalition, then there exists
more than one exact balanced weight vector, but these weight vectors are related in a special
way and induce the same constraint on the game. Furthermore, if for an exact balanced
collection all weight vectors induce the same constraint on the game, then the collection is
minimal exact balanced.
Theorem 3.9. Let E ∈ EN . Then E ∈ ENmin and N ∈ E if and only if for every λ ∈ Λ(E) and
µ ∈ Λ(E) there exists a scalar a > 0 such that
µS = aλS for all S ∈ E\{N},
µN = λN = 1.
Proof. For the ‘only if’ part of the proof, let E ∈ ENmin be such that N ∈ E . Let λ ∈ Λ(E).
It is readily checked that λN ≤ 1, and if λN < 1 we obtain that the collection C = E\{N} is
exact balanced with weight vector γS =
λS
1−λN
for every S ∈ C. Hence, λN = 1.
Take T ∈ E such that λT < 0. Such an T ∈ E exists, as N ∈ E and therefore E 6∈ B
N
min. As∑
S∈E\{N} λSe
S = 0 and λS > 0 for all S ∈ E\{T}, we obtain that S ( T for all S ∈ E\{T,N}.
This implies that the location of the negative weight is unique, µT < 0 for every µ ∈ Λ(E).
Rewriting
∑
S∈E\{N} λSe
S = 0 yields
∑
S∈E\{N}−
λS
λT
eS = eT , and therefore E\{N,T} ∈ BT .
If there exists a minimal balanced collection B ∈ BTmin such that B ( E\{T,N}, it is readily
checked that B ∪ {T,N} is an exact balanced collection, which contradicts our assumption
of E ∈ ENmin. Hence, E\{N,T} ∈ B
T
min. Since E\{N,T} ∈ B
T
min, by Theorem 2.7 there is a
unique balanced vector of weights β of E\{N,T}. Note that
eN = eN + λT e
T +
∑
S∈E\{N,T}
λSe
S
= eN + λT
∑
S∈E\{N,T}
βSe
S +
∑
S∈E\{N,T}
λSe
S
= eN +
∑
S∈E\{N,T}
(λTβS + λS)e
S .
This implies that
∑
S∈E\{N,T}(λTβS + λS)e
S = 0. If λTβS 6= λS for some S ∈ E\{N,T} we
have β+ǫ(λTβ+λ)) ∈ B
T
min for small ǫ > 0. So, λTβS+λS = 0 and therefore λS = −λTβS for
every S ∈ E\{N,T}. Now take µ ∈ Λ(E) and take a = µT
λT
. Since µT < 0 and λT < 0, a > 0.
We have µT = aλT by definition, and µS = −µTβS = −aλTβS = λS for every S ∈ E\{E,T}.
For the ‘if’ part of the proof, clearly N ∈ E . Suppose E 6∈ ENmin. As E is not minimal, there
exists a D ( E such that D ∈ ENmin. Let λ ∈ Λ(E) and δ ∈ Λ(D). Define µ = (1 − b)λ + bδ,
where b > 0 is sufficiently small, such that the sign of δS equals the sign of µS for every
S ∈ E . Clearly, µ ∈ Λ(E). Take T ∈ E\D and U ∈ E ∩ D, U 6= N . Such a U exists, as
{N} is not a minimal exact balanced collection by definition. Since µT = (1 − b)λT and
µU = (1 − b)λU + bδU 6= (1 − b)λU , there does not exist a scalar a > 0 such that µT = aλT
and µU = aλU , which is a contradiction.
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We have shown that for minimal exact balanced collections either the corresponding weight
vector is unique or all corresponding weight vectors induce the same constraint on the game.
This way, for every minimal exact balanced collection we can use one standardized weight
vector. In the remainder, for every minimal balanced collection B we denote βB for the
unique balanced weight vector. More general, for every E ∈ ENmin with N 6∈ E , we denote
λE for the unique exact balanced weight vector. For E ∈ ENmin with N ∈ E , λ
E denotes the
standardized exact balanced weight vector such that min{λES | S ∈ E} = −1. Notice that for
notational convenience, for B ∈ BNmin the standardized weight vector is both denoted by β
B
and λB.
4 Partitioning the class of minimal exact balanced collections
In this section we study the structure of the class of minimal exact balanced collections. It
turns out that this set can be decomposed in three parts, all related to balanced collections.
The first part consists of all minimal balanced collections.
Theorem 4.1. BNmin ⊆ E
N
min.
Proof. Let B ∈ BNmin. It is clear that every minimal balanced collection is also exact balanced.
It remains to show that it is also minimal exact balanced. Assume there exists an exact
balanced collection E ( B and take λ ∈ Λ(E). We will show that this results in a contradiction
with B ∈ BNmin.
Since B ∈ BNmin we know that there exists a T ∈ E such that λT < 0 as B does not have a
proper subset that is balanced. Take a = min{
βBS
λS
| S ∈ E\{T}} and γ = 11−a(β
B − aλ). Note
that 0 < a < 1 since βBS > 0 and λS > 0 for all S ∈ E\{T}, and a ≥ 1 would imply that∑
S∈E
λSe
S =
∑
S∈E\{T}
λSe
S + λT e
T ,
<
∑
S∈E\{T}
βBS e
S + βBT e
T ,
=
∑
S∈E
βBS e
S ,
≤ eN .
Now γS ≥ 0 for all S ∈ B, with equality for at least one coalition. Take C = {S ∈ E | γS > 0}.
Then C is a proper subset of B and
∑
S∈C
γSe
S =
∑
S∈B
γSe
S =
∑
S∈B
βBS
1− a
eS −
∑
S∈E
aλS
1− a
eS =
1
1− a
eN −
a
1− a
eN = eN ,
so C ∈ BN , contradicting B ∈ BNmin.
The second part of the partition of ENmin consists of so-called negative balanced collections. The
set of all negative balanced collections is denoted by B
N
min. The negative balanced collections
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can be obtained, by replacing one coalition in a minimal balanced collection by its complement.
However, this is only allowed for the coalitions with weight strictly smaller than 1. We have
B
N
min = {(B\{S}) ∪ ({N\S}) | B ∈ B
N
min, S ∈ B : β
B
S < 1}.
Example 4.2. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and consider the minimal balanced collection B =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {4}}. For the weight vector βB it holds that βB{1,2} =
1
2 . This means
that E = (B\{{1, 2}}) ∪ ({{3, 4}}) = {{3, 4}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {4}} ∈ B
N
min. It is readily checked
that E ∈ EN , since e{1,3} + e{2,3} + 2e{4} − e{3,4} = eN . As βB{4} = 1, we cannot replace the
coalition {4} by its complement to obtain an element of B
N
min. ⊳
By definition of B
N
min and the observation that N 6∈ B for every B ∈ B
N
min, we have N 6∈ E
for every E ∈ B
N
min. Hence, for this second part of the partition we can focus on collections
without the grand coalition. Consider such a collection which is not minimal balanced. Then
it is minimal exact balanced if and only if it is negative balanced.
Theorem 4.3. Let E ∈ B
N
min. Let B ∈ B
N
min and U ∈ B be such that E = (B\{U})∪ (N\{U}).
Let λS =
βBS
1−βB
U
for all S ∈ B\{U}, λN\U = −
βBU
1−βB
U
and λS = 0 for S ∈ N\E. Then λ ∈ Λ(E).
Proof. As B ∈ BNmin and β
B
U < 1, we know N\U 6∈ B. As 0 < β
B
U < 1, we obtain that
λS =
βBS
1−βB
U
> 0 for all S ∈ E\{U} and λN\U = −
βBU
1−βB
U
< 0. For i ∈ U ,
∑
S∈E,S∋i
λS =
∑
S∈B\{U},S∋i
βBS
1− βBU
=
1
1− βBU
∑
S∈B\{U},S∋i
βBS = 1
and for i ∈ N\U it holds that
∑
S∈E,S∋i
λS =
∑
S∈B\{U},S∋i
βBS
1− βBU
−
βBU
1− βBU
= 1,
So, indeed λ ∈ Λ(E).
Theorem 4.4.
(i) B
N
min ⊆ E
N
min\B
N
min.
(ii) Let E ∈ ENmin\B
N
min and N 6∈ E. Then E ∈ B
N
min.
Proof of (i). Let E ∈ B
N
min. Let B ∈ B
N
min and U ∈ B be such that E = (B\{U}) ∪ (N\{U}).
Let λS =
βB
S
1−βB
U
for all S ∈ B\{U}, λN\U = −
βB
U
1−βB
U
and λS = 0 for S ∈ N\E . From Theorem
4.3, it follows that λ ∈ Λ(E) and therefore E ∈ EN .
We prove that E ∈ ENmin. Assume on the contrary that there exists a subset D ( E , with
D ∈ ENmin. By minimality of B, it must hold that N\U ∈ D as otherwise D ( B which would
be in contradiction with Theorem 4.1.
We distinguish two cases:
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(i) Assume λDS > 0 for all S ∈ D\{N\U}. We know λ
D
N\U < 1, since λ
D
N\U = 1 would mean
that D\{N\U} is a balanced collection on U which contradicts minimality of B as we
can omit U from B. Given that λD
N\U < 1, we can reverse the procedure for constructing
E : take A = (D\{N\U}) ∪ ({U}) and take αS =
λDS
1−λD
N\U
for all S ∈ D\{N\U} and
αU = −
λD
N\U
1−λD
N\U
. We obtain αS > 0 for all S ∈ A\{U} and αU 6= 0. Furthermore, for
i ∈ U :
∑
S∈A,S∋i
αS =
∑
S∈D\{N\U},S∋i
λDS
1− λD
N\U
−
λD
N\{U}
1− λD
N\U
=
1
1− λD
N\U
−
λD
N\U
1− λD
N\U
= 1,
and for i ∈ N\U it holds that
∑
S∈A,S∋i
αS =
∑
S∈D\{N\U},S∋i
λDS
1− λD
N\U
=
1− λD
N\U
1− λD
N\U
= 1,
So, α ∈ Λ(A) and therefore A ∈ EN . As A ( B this contradicts our assumption of
B ∈ ENmin.
(ii) Assume λDT < 0 for some T ∈ D\{N\U}, which means that D ∈ E
N
min\B
N
min and
λD
N\U > 0. Take c = −
λN\U
λD
N\U
, and take T ∈ D such that λDT < 0. We construct the
weight vector γ with γS =
c
1+cβS +
1
1+cλ
D
S for all S ∈ E and γS = 0 if S ∈ N\E .
Furthermore, take C = {S ∈ E | γS 6= 0}. By definition of β, we obtain γN\U = 0 and
γS > 0 for all S ∈ C\{T}. So, C ( B and γ ∈ Λ(C) so we obtain a contradiction with
the minimality of B.
So, we have E ∈ ENmin. From Theorem 3.7 it follows that Λ(E) = {λ}. Since λN\U ,
E ∈ ENmin\B
N
min.
Proof of (ii) Let E ∈ ENmin\B
N
min and N 6∈ E . Take T ∈ E such that λ
E
T < 0. Take B =
(E\{T}) ∪ {N\T} and define βS =
λES
1−λE
T
for all S ∈ E\{T} and βN\T = −
λET
1−λE
T
. We obtain
βS > 0 for all S ∈ B. Furthermore, for i ∈ N\T :
∑
S∈B,S∋i
βS =
∑
S∈E,S∋i
λES
1− λET
+ βN\T =
1
1− λET
−
λET
1− λET
= 1,
and for i ∈ T it holds that
∑
S∈B,S∋i
βS =
∑
S∈E\{T},S∋i
λES
1− λET
=
1− λET
1− λET
= 1,
So, B ∈ BN . It remains to show that B is minimal. Here we need the condition that N 6∈ E ,
since there is no minimal balanced collection that contains N . If B is not minimal, then there
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exists a B′ ∈ BNmin such that B
′ ( B. More precisely, as every balanced collection is the union
of minimal balanced collections there exists a B′ ∈ BNmin such that N\T ∈ B
′.
First suppose there exists a β′ ∈ Λ+(B′) such that β′
N\T < 1. Then we obtain by definition
of B
N
min that (B
′\{N\T}) ∪ ({T}) ∈ B
N
min ⊆ E
N
min\B
N
min. Consequently, we have B
′\{N\T} ∪
{T} ( E , a contraction with the minimality of E .
Next suppose that for every minimal balanced collection C ( B with (N\T ) ∈ C it holds
that βC
N\T = 1. Take such a minimal balanced collection C ( B with (N\T ) ∈ C. We define a
new collection D = C\{N\T}. Since N\T 6∈ D, we have D ( E . Also,
∑
S∈B β
C
Se
S = eN and
therefore
∑
S∈D β
C
Se
S = eN −βC
N\T e
N\T = eT . This contradicts the minimality of E , since we
can take δS = β
C
S for every S ∈ D and δT = −1, and we have (1 − ǫ)β + ǫδ ∈ Λ(E) for small
ǫ > 0.
The third part of the partition consists of the minimal subbalanced collections. These collec-
tions consist of all minimal balanced collections of a subgame, to which the grand coalition
of both the subgame and the original game are added.
For every M ( N such that |M | ≥ 2, define
B˜Nmin(M) = {B ∪ {M,N} | B ∈ B
M
min},
Also, define
B˜Nmin = ∪M(N,|M |≥2B˜
N
min(M),
as the set of all minimal subbalanced collections.
Theorem 4.5. Let E ∈ B˜Nmin. Let M ( N and B ∈ B
M
min be such that E = (B\{M,N}). Let
λS = β
B
S for all S ∈ B, λM = −1, λN = 1 and λS = 0 for all S ∈ N\E. Then λ ∈ Λ(E).
Proof. It is readily checked that
∑
S∈E λSe
S =
∑
S∈B β
B
S e
S − eM + eN = eN and λS > 0 for
all S ∈ E\{M}. Hence, λ ∈ Λ(E).
Theorem 4.6.
(i) B˜Nmin ⊆ E
N
min\B
N
min,
(ii) Let E ∈ ENmin\B
N
min and N ∈ E. Then E ∈ B˜
N
min.
Proof of (i). Let E ∈ B˜Nmin. Let M ( N and B ∈ B
M
min be such that E = (B\{M,N}). Let
λS = β
B
S for all S ∈ B, λM = −1, λN = 1 and λS = 0 for all S ∈ N\E . Theorem 4.5 shows
that λ ∈ Λ(E), so E ∈ EN .
Suppose E 6∈ ENmin. Take D ( E such that D ∈ E
N
min. We have N ∈ D since the players
in N\M are not present in any other coalition in E . This also implies that λDN = 1. As
{N} 6∈ EN we have
∑
S∈D\{N} λ
D
S = 0. This means that there exists a T ∈ D\{N} such that
λDT < 0 and S ⊆ T for all S ∈ D\{N}. We obtain D\{N,T} ∈ B
T .
First, suppose T = M . Then D ( E gives D\{N,M} ( B which contradicts B ∈ BMmin.
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|N | 3 4 5
|ENmin| 11 165 8572
|BNmin| 5 41 1474
|B
N
min| 3 98 6833
|B˜Nmin| 3 26 265
Table 3: Number of collections in the three parts of the partition
Second, suppose T 6= M . As M 6∈ D, D\{N} ( B. Define the weight vector δ such
that δS = λ
D
S for all S ∈ D\{N} and δS = 0 otherwise. Now, for small ǫ > 0 we have
ǫλD + βB ∈ Λ+(B) which contradicts Theorem 2.7.
Proof of (ii). By Theorem 3.9 we have λEN = 1. Take T ∈ E such that λ
E
T = −1. We have∑
S∈E\{N} λSe
S = 0 which yields
∑
S∈E\{N} λSe
S = eT , and therefore E\{N,T} ∈ BT . If
there exists a minimal balanced collection B ∈ BTmin such that B ( E\{T,N}, it is readily
checked that B ∪ {T,N} is an exact balanced collection, which contradicts our assumption of
E ∈ ENmin. Hence, E\{N,T} ∈ B
T
min and E ∈ B˜
N
min.
The following corollary follows from Theorem 4.1, Theorem 4.4 and Theorem 4.6.
Corollary 4.7. The three sets B˜Nmin, B
N
min, and B
N
min form a partition of E
N
min.
The number of collections in the different parts of the partition are shown in Table 3. Ap-
pendix A contains the minimal balanced, minimal subbalanced and minimal negative balanced
collections for 3 and 4 players. The minimal balanced collections are generated using the pro-
cedure by Peleg (1965). The other collections are generated using their relation with minimal
balanced collections as described in the previous theorems.
5 Sufficient conditions for exactness
As mentioned before, the class of minimal balanced collections is useful as one does not need
other balanced collections to check whether a game is balanced. The class of minimal exact
balanced weights exhibits the same feature: the following theorem shows that we only need
the minimal exact balanced collections to check whether a game is exact.
Theorem 5.1. Let v ∈ V (E) for all E ∈ ENmin. Then v ∈ V .
Proof. LetD ∈ EN\ENmin. Let δ ∈ Λ(D). It suffices to show that v ∈ V (δ) i.e.,
∑
S∈D δSv(S) ≤
v(N).
First, assume δ ∈ Λ+(D). Then Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 2.6 imply that v ∈ V (δ).
Second, assume that δ 6∈ Λ+(D). Take U ∈ D such that δU < 0.
If U = N , then define C = D\{N} and γS =
δS
1−δN
for all S ∈ C and γS = 0 for all
S ∈ N\C. We have γ ∈ Λ+(C) and C ∈ BN . Note that v ∈ V (δ) is directly implied by
v ∈ V (γ). Hence, in the remainder we will assume that U 6= N .
Since D 6∈ ENmin, we can take A ∈ E
N
min such that A ( D.
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Case 1: λAU ≥ 0, so either λ
A
U > 0 or U 6∈ A. If A ∈ E
N
min\B
N
min, then take T ∈ A such that
λAT < 0. If A ∈ B
N
min, define T = ∅. Define a = min{
λS
λA
S
| S ∈ A\{T,U}}. We first show that
a ≤ 1.
Suppose on the contrary that a > 1. As δS > λ
A
S for every S ∈ D\{U}, we have for
i ∈ N\U that ∑
S∈D,
S∋i
δS =
∑
S∈D\{U},
S∋i
δS >
∑
S∈D\{U},
S∋i
λAS = 1,
a contradiction.
If we can find an A ∈ EN such that A ( D and ∩E∈EN
min
V (E) ∩ V (A) ⊆ V (δ), we may
conclude that ∩E∈EN
min
V (E) ⊆ V (δ). We discriminate between two subcases:
• a = 1. If T\U 6= ∅, then for i ∈ T\U it holds that
∑
S∈D,
S∋i
δS =
∑
S∈D\{T,U},
S∋i
λS + δT >
∑
S∈D\{T,U},
S∋i
λAS + λ
A
T = 1,
which cannot hold. On the other hand, if T\U = ∅, define κS =
δS−λ
A
S
δA
U
−δU
for all S ∈ D,
κN = 1 and κS = 0 for all S ∈ N\(D ∪ {N}). Take K = {S ∈ D ∪ {N} | κS 6= 0}. Now
V (κ) ∩ V (λA) ⊆ V (δ) as from
(λAU − δU )
∑
S∈K
κSv(S) =
∑
S∈D\{U}
(δS − λ
A
S )v(S)− (λ
A
U − δU )v(U) + (λ
A
U − δU )v(N)
≤ (λAU − δU )v(N),
and
∑
S∈A λ
A
S v(S) ≤ v(N) it follows that
∑
S∈D δSv(S) ≤ v(N).
Note that K\{N,U} ∈ BU as κS > 0 for all S ∈ K\{N,U} and
∑
S∈K
κSe
S =
∑
S∈D\{U}
δSe
S−
∑
S∈D\{U}
λAS e
S =
1
λAU − δU
((eN −δUe
U )−(eN −λAUe
U )) = eU .
• a < 1. We define κS =
1
1−aδS −
a
1−aλ
A
S for all S ∈ D, κS = 0 for S ∈ N\D and define
K = {S ∈ D | κS 6= 0}. By definition of a, we obtain K ( D. It is now easily seen that
V (κ) ∩ V (λA) ⊆ V (δ), as
∑
S∈D
δSv(S) = (1− a)
∑
S∈K
κSv(S) + a
∑
S∈A
λAS v(S) ≤ v(N).
Note that K ∈ EN and κ ∈ Λ(K), as κS > 0 for all S ∈ K\{U}, κU < 0, and
∑
S∈K
κSe
S =
∑
S∈D
(
1
1− a
δS −
a
1− a
λAS )e
S =
1
1− a
∑
S∈D
δSe
S −
a
1− a
∑
S∈A
λAS e
S = eN .
Case 2: λAU < 0. Take a = min{
δS
λA
S
| S ∈ A}. It holds that a < 1, as a = 1 would imply
that δS = λ
A
S for all S ∈ A which implies δS = 0 for all S ∈ D\A. Furthermore, a > 1 would
imply that
∑
S∈D,S∋i δS >
∑
S∈A,S∋i λ
A
S = 1 for i ∈ N\U .
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Again, if we can find an A ∈ EN such that A ( D and ∩E∈EN
min
V (E) ∩ V (A) ⊆ V (δ), we
may conclude that ∩E∈EN
min
V (E) ⊆ V (δ). We construct κS =
1
1−aδS −
a
1−aλ
A
S for all S ∈ D
and K = {S ∈ D | κS 6= 0}. We have V (κ) ∩ V (λ
A) ⊆ V (δ), as
∑
S∈D
δSv(S) = (1− a)
∑
S∈K
κSv(S) + a
∑
S∈A
λAS v(S) ≤ v(N).
We have K ∈ EN and κ ∈ Λ(K) since κS ≥ 0 for all S ∈ K\{U} and
∑
S∈K κSe
S = eN .
The equivalent of Theorem 2.8 for minimal exact balanced collections however does not
hold, as there exist minimal exact balanced collections that are redundant. The following
example illustrates this.
Example 5.2. Consider the minimal exact balanced collections B = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}
with weight vector βB such that βB{1,2} = β
B
{1,3} = β
B
{2,3} =
1
2 , C = {{1}, {2, 3}} with weights
βC{1} = β
C
{2,3} = 1 and E = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1}} with λ
E
{1,2} = λ
E
{1,3} = 1 and λ
E
{1} = −1. We
have V (C) ∩ V (E) ⊆ V (B), since βB = 12β
C + 12λ
E . ⊳
The question arises which minimal exact balanced collections we can discard. It turns out
that for |N | ≥ 3, ∩E∈EN
min
\BN
min
V (E) ⊆ V . So, we can omit all the minimal balanced conditions.
To show this, we first introduce a lemma to construct particular members of ENmin.
Lemma 5.3. Let |N | ≥ 3 and take S ∈ N and T ∈ N such that S ∩ T = ∅.
(i) If S ∪ T = N , |T | ≥ 2 and i ∈ T , then {S ∪ {i}, T, {i}} ∈ ENmin\B
N
min.
(ii) If S ∪ T 6= N , then {S, T, S ∪ T,N} ∈ ENmin\B
N
min.
Proof of (i). The collection {S∪{i}, T,N\{i}} is minimal balanced with weight vector λ such
that λS∪{i} = λT = λN\{i} =
1
2 . By definition of B
N
min, we have {S ∪ {i}, T, {i}} ∈ B
N
min. By
Theorem 4.4 this means that {S ∪ {i}, T, {i}} ∈ ENmin\B
N
min.
Proof of (ii). The collection {S, T} is minimal balanced for player set S ∪ T . By definition
of B˜Nmin(S ∪ T ), we have {S, T, S ∪ T,N} ∈ B˜
N
min(S ∪ T ). By Theorem 4.6 this means that
{S, T, S ∪ T,N} ∈ ENmin\B
N
min.
Theorem 5.4. Let v ∈ V (E) for every E ∈ ENmin\B
N
min and |N | ≥ 3. Then v ∈ V .
Proof. Let B ∈ BNmin. First, consider the case where B is a partition.
Assume B = {S, T} for some S, T ∈ 2N\{∅}. Note that βBS = β
B
T = 1. Without loss of
generality, we assume |S| ≤ |T |. Take i ∈ T , A = {{i}, S, S∪{i}, N} with λA{i} = λ
A
S = λ
A
N = 1
and λA
S∪{i} = −1 and D = {S ∪ {i}, T, {i}} with λ
D
S∪{i} = λ
D
T = 1 and λ
D
{i} = −1. By Lemma
5.3, A ∈ ENmin\B
N
min and D ∈ E
N
min\B
N
min. Now v ∈ V
+(B) follows from v ∈ V (A) and
v ∈ V (D): from
v({i}) + v(S)− v(S ∪ {i}) + v(N) ≤ v(N),
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and
v(S ∪ {i}) + v(T )− v({i}) ≤ v(N),
it follows that
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(N).
We show that for every partition B with |B| ≥ 3 there exists a partition C such that |C| < |B|
and ∩E∈EN
min
\BN
min
V (E) ∩ V (C) ⊆ V (B). This suffices to show that ∩E∈EN
min
\BN
min
V (E) ⊆ V (B)
for every partition B ∈ BNmin.
Assume that B is a partition of the player set N , with |B| ≥ 3. Take S ∈ B and T ∈ B
with S 6= T . Define A = {S, T, S ∪ T,N} with λAS = λ
A
T = λ
A
N = 1 and λ
A
S∪T = −1. By
Lemma 5.3 we have A ∈ ENmin\B
N
min. Define D = (B\{S, T}) ∪ {S ∪ T} and δ ∈ Λ(D) such
that δS = 1 for all S ∈ D. It is readily checked that V (D) ∩ V (A) ⊆ V (B). Furthermore, D
is a partition and |D| < |B|.
Second, consider the case where B is not a partition. Take T ∈ B such that βBT < 1.
As B is not a partition, such a coalition exists and N\T 6∈ B. Define C = {T,N\T} and
D = (B\{T}) ∪ {N\T} with δS =
βBS
1−βB
T
for all S ∈ B\{T} and δN\T = −
βBT
1−βB
T
. We have
already shown that ∩E∈EN
min
\BN
min
V (E) ⊆ V (C). Furthermore, by Theorem 4.4 we know that
D ∈ ENmin\B
N
min. From
βBT [v(T ) + v(N\T )] ≤ β
B
T v(N),
and
(1− βBT )

 ∑
S∈D\(N\T )
βBS
1− βBT
v(S)−
βBT
1− βBT
v(N\T )

 ≤ (1− βBT )v(N),
it follows that
∑
S∈B
βBS v(S) ≤ v(N).
So ∩E∈EN
min
\BN
min
V (E) ⊆ ∩B∈BN
min
V (B). Therefore, v ∈ V if and only if v ∈ v(E) for all
E ∈ ENmin\B
N
min.
We have shown that the class of minimal balanced collections is redundant to verify that a
game is exact. However, as the following example demonstrates, there exists an even smaller
subclass of the class of minimal exact balanced collections that still ensures exactness of the
game.
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Example 5.5. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Consider the minimal exact balanced collections A =
{{2}, {1, 4}, {1, 2, 4}, N}, D = {{1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2}} and E = {{2}, {1, 2}, {1, 4}, {1, 2, 3}}.
From
v({2}) + v({1, 4}) − v({1, 2, 4}) + v(N) ≤ v(N),
and
v({1, 2, 4) + v({1, 2, 3}) − v({1, 2}) ≤ v(N),
we have that
v({2}) + v({1, 4}) + v({1, 2, 3}) − v({1, 2}) ≤ v(N).
This implies that V (A) ∩ V (D) ⊆ V (E), so E is redundant. ⊳
Further research on the topic could possibly establish a characterization of a subclass of
minimal exact balanced collections that is sharp, in the sense that no collection can be left
out while still guaranteing exactness.
6 On the construction of minimal exact balanced collections
Using Theorem 2.6, it can be checked if a game is balanced utilizing minimal balanced collec-
tions only. However, the efficiency of this approach is dependent on the construction of these
collections. Peleg (1965) provides an efficient and comprehensive algorithm for obtaining all
minimal balanced collections. Given a player set and the corresponding class of minimal bal-
anced collections, the algorithm constructs from every minimal balanced collection a number
of candidate collections for a player set with one player extra. By checking a number of basic
conditions on the candidate collection and the weight vector of the collection on the smaller
player set, it is readily checked if the candidate is indeed minimal.
This procedure can be extended to efficiently check for exactness of a game. As we de-
rived an explicit relation between minimal balanced collections on the one hand and minimal
negative balanced collections and minimal subbalanced collections on the other hand, the
collections and their respective weight vectors can be constructed from the minimal balanced
collections. Theorem 4.4 and Theorem 4.6 prove the relation between minimal balanced col-
lections on the one hand and minimal negative balanced collections and minimal subbalanced
collections on the other hand. Theorem 4.3 and 4.5 show how the exact balanced weight
vectors can be obtained from minimal balanced weight vectors. Note that the minimal bal-
anced collections of every subset of the player set, which are needed to construct the minimal
subbalanced collections, are constructed by the Peleg procedure in the process.
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A Minimal exact balanced collections
A.1 N = {1, 2, 3}
Minimal balanced
Collections Weights
{1} {2} {3} 1 1 1
{3} {1,2} 1 1
{2} {1,3} 1 1
{1} {2,3} 1 1
{1,2} {1,3} {2,3} 1/2 1/2 1/2
Minimal negative balanced
Collections Weights
{1} {1,2} {1,3} -1 1 1
{2} {1,2} {2,3} -1 1 1
{3} {1,3} {2,3} -1 1 1
Minimal subbalanced
Collections Standardized weights
{1} {2} {1,2} {1,2,3} 1 1 -1 1
{1} {3} {1,3} {1,2,3} 1 1 -1 1
{2} {3} {2,3} {1,2,3} 1 1 -1 1
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A.2 N = {1, 2, 3, 4}
Minimal balanced
Collections Weights
{1} {4} 1 1
{1} {2,3,4} 1 1
{2} {1,3,4} 1 1
{3} {1,2,4} 1 1
{4} {1,2,3} 1 1
{1,2} {3,4} 1 1
{1,3} {2,4} 1 1
{1,4} {2,3} 1 1
{1} {2} {3,4} 1 1 1
{1} {3} {2,4} 1 1 1
{2} {3} {1,4} 1 1 1
{2} {4} {1,3} 1 1 1
{3} {4} {1,2} 1 1 1
{1,2} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2
{1,3} {1,2,4} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2
{1,4} {1,2,3} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2
{2,3} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2
{2,4} {1,2,3} {1,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2
{3,4} {1,2,3} {1,2,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2
{1} {2} {3} {4} 1 1 1 1
{1} {2,3} {2,4} {3,4} 1 1/2 1/2 1/2
{1} {2,3} {2,4} {1,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
{1} {2,3} {3,4} {1,2,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
{1} {2,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
{2} {1,3} {1,4} {3,4} 1 1/2 1/2 1/2
{2} {1,3} {1,4} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
{2} {1,3} {3,4} {1,2,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
{2} {1,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
{3} {1,2} {1,4} {2,4} 1 1/2 1/2 1/2
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Minimal balanced (continued)
Collections Weights
{3} {1,2} {1,4} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
{3} {1,2} {2,4} {1,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
{3} {1,4} {2,4} {1,2,3} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
{4} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} 1 1/2 1/2 1/2
{4} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
{4} {1,2} {2,3} {1,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
{4} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
{1,2} {1,3} {1,4} {2,3,4} 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3
{1,2} {2,3} {2,4} {1,3,4} 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3
{1,3} {2,3} {3,4} {1,2,4} 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3
{1,4} {2,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3
{1,2,3} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3
Minimal negative balanced
Collections Weights
{1} {1,2} {1,3,4} -1 1 1
{1} {1,3} {1,2,4} -1 1 1
{1} {1,4} {1,2,3} -1 1 1
{2} {1,2} {2,3,4} -1 1 1
{2} {2,3} {1,2,4} -1 1 1
{2} {2,4} {1,2,3} -1 1 1
{3} {1,3} {2,3,4} -1 1 1
{3} {2,3} {1,3,4} -1 1 1
{3} {3,4} {1,2,3} -1 1 1
{4} {1,4} {2,3,4} -1 1 1
{4} {2,4} {1,3,4} -1 1 1
{4} {3,4} {1,2,4} -1 1 1
{1,2} {1,2,3} {1,2,4} -1 1 1
{1,3} {1,2,3} {1,3,4} -1 1 1
{1,4} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} -1 1 1
{2,3} {1,2,3} {2,3,4} -1 1 1
{2,4} {1,2,4} {2,3,4} -1 1 1
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Minimal negative balanced (continued)
Collections Weights
{3,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} -1 1 1
{1} {2} {1,3} {1,4} -1 1 1 1
{1} {2} {2,3} {2,4} 1 -1 1 1
{1} {3} {1,2} {1,4} -1 1 1 1
{1} {3} {2,3} {3,4} 1 -1 1 1
{1} {4} {1,2} {1,3} -1 1 1 1
{1} {4} {2,4} {3,4} 1 -1 1 1
{1} {1,2} {1,3} {1,4} -2 1 1 1
{1} {1,2} {2,3} {2,4} 2 -1 1 1
{1} {1,2} {2,3} {1,2,4} 1 -1 1 1
{1} {1,2} {2,4} {1,2,3} 1 -1 1 1
{1} {1,3} {2,3} {3,4} 2 -1 1 1
{1} {1,3} {2,3} {1,3,4} 1 -1 1 1
{1} {1,3} {3,4} {1,2,3} 1 -1 1 1
{1} {1,4} {2,4} {3,4} 2 -1 1 1
{1} {1,4} {2,4} {1,3,4} 1 -1 1 1
{1} {1,4} {3,4} {1,2,4} 1 -1 1 1
{1} {1,2,3} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
{2} {3} {1,2} {2,4} -1 1 1 1
{2} {3} {1,3} {3,4} 1 -1 1 1
{2} {4} {1,2} {2,3} -1 1 1 1
{2} {4} {1,4} {3,4} 1 -1 1 1
{2} {1,2} {1,3} {1,4} 2 -1 1 1
{2} {1,2} {1,3} {1,2,4} 1 -1 1 1
{2} {1,2} {1,4} {1,2,3} 1 -1 1 1
{2} {1,2} {2,3} {2,4} -2 1 1 1
{2} {1,3} {2,3} {3,4} 2 1 -1 1
{2} {1,3} {2,3} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{2} {1,4} {2,4} {3,4} 2 1 -1 1
{2} {1,4} {2,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{2} {2,3} {3,4} {1,2,3} 1 -1 1 1
{2} {2,4} {3,4} {1,2,4} 1 -1 1 1
{2} {1,2,3} {1,2,4} {2,3,4} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
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Minimal negative balanced (continued)
Collections Weights
{3} {4} {1,3} {2,3} -1 1 1 1
{3} {4} {1,4} {2,4} 1 -1 1 1
{3} {1,2} {1,3} {1,4} 2 1 -1 1
{3} {1,2} {1,3} {1,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{3} {1,2} {2,3} {2,4} 2 1 -1 1
{3} {1,2} {2,3} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{3} {1,3} {1,4} {1,2,3} 1 -1 1 1
{3} {1,3} {2,3} {3,4} -2 1 1 1
{3} {1,4} {2,4} {3,4} 2 1 1 -1
{3} {1,4} {3,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{3} {2,3} {2,4} {1,2,3} 1 -1 1 1
{3} {2,4} {3,4} {1,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{3} {1,2,3} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
{4} {1,2} {1,3} {1,4} 2 1 1 -1
{4} {1,2} {1,4} {1,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{4} {1,2} {2,3} {2,4} 2 1 1 -1
{4} {1,2} {2,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{4} {1,3} {1,4} {1,2,4} 1 1 -1 1
{4} {1,3} {2,3} {3,4} 2 1 1 -1
{4} {1,3} {3,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{4} {1,4} {2,4} {3,4} -2 1 1 1
{4} {2,3} {2,4} {1,2,4} 1 1 -1 1
{4} {2,3} {3,4} {1,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{4} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
{1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,4} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1
{1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,3,4} 1/2 - 1/2 1/2 1
{1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 - 1/2 1
{1,2} {1,3} {1,2,3} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{1,2} {1,4} {2,4} {1,2,3} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1
{1,2} {1,4} {2,4} {1,3,4} 1/2 - 1/2 1/2 1
{1,2} {1,4} {2,4} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 - 1/2 1
{1,2} {1,4} {1,2,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{1,2} {2,3} {1,2,3} {1,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
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Minimal negative balanced (continued)
Collections Weights
{1,2} {2,4} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{1,3} {1,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1
{1,3} {1,4} {3,4} {1,2,4} 1/2 - 1/2 1/2 1
{1,3} {1,4} {3,4} {2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 - 1/2 1
{1,3} {1,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3} {1,2,4} 1 1 -1 1
{1,3} {3,4} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} 1 1 1 -1
{1,4} {2,4} {1,2,3} {1,2,4} 1 1 1 -1
{1,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} {1,3,4} 1 1 1 -1
{2,3} {2,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} - 1/2 1/2 1/2 1
{2,3} {2,4} {3,4} {1,2,4} 1/2 - 1/2 1/2 1
{2,3} {2,4} {3,4} {1,3,4} 1/2 1/2 - 1/2 1
{2,3} {2,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 1 -1
{2,3} {3,4} {1,2,4} {2,3,4} 1 1 1 -1
{2,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} {2,3,4} 1 1 1 -1
Minimal subbalanced
Collections Standardized weights
{1} {2} {1,2} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{1} {3} {1,3} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{1} {4} {1,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{1} {2,3} {1,2,3} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{1} {2,4} {1,2,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{1} {3,4} {1,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{2} {3} {2,3} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{2} {4} {2,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{2} {1,3} {1,2,3} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{2} {1,4} {1,2,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{2} {3,4} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{3} {4} {3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{3} {1,2} {1,2,3} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{3} {1,4} {1,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
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Minimal subbalanced (continued)
Collections Standardized weights
{3} {2,4} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{4} {1,2} {1,2,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{4} {1,3} {1,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{4} {2,3} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 -1 1
{1} {2} {3} {1,2,3} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 1 -1 1
{1} {2} {4} {1,2,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 1 -1 1
{1} {3} {4} {1,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 1 -1 1
{2} {3} {4} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1 1 1 -1 1
{1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3} {1,2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 -1 1
{1,2} {1,4} {2,4} {1,2,4} {1,2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 -1 1
{1,4} {1,3} {3,4} {1,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 -1 1
{2,4} {3,4} {2,3} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4} 1/2 1/2 1/2 -1 1
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